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Abstract. Polls and coalition signals can help strategic voters in multiparty systems with
proportional representation and coalition governments to optimise their vote decision.
Using a laboratory experiment embedded in two real election campaigns, this study focuses
on voters’ attention to and perception of polls and coalition signals. The manipulation of
polls and coalition signals allows a causal test of their influence on strategic voting in a
realistic environment. The findings suggest that active information acquisition to form fairly
accurate perceptions of election outcomes can compensate for the advantage of high politi-
cal sophistication. The theory of strategic voting is supported by the evidence, but only for a
small number of voters. Most insincere vote decisions are explained by other factors. Thus,
the common practice to consider all insincere voters as strategic is misleading.
Keywords: strategic voting; polls; coalitions; expectations; experiment
Introduction
Voters face a dilemma if their preferred party has no chance of winning in
the upcoming election. If instrumental considerations motivate the vote, the
expressive satisfaction of casting a ballot for the most preferred party is
insufficient to compensate for the feeling of ‘wasting’ a vote that fails to
influence government formation and, ultimately, desirable policy outcomes.
For those who feel a citizen’s duty is to vote and who care about the
outcome of the next election, just staying at home is not an option. Such
voters might rather decide to defect and cast a ballot for a less-preferred
party, but one that will play a more decisive role in the formation of the next
government. Such behaviour is called ‘strategic voting’ (Cox 1997; Fisher
2004). Paraphrasing a former United States Secretary of Defense, strategic
voters work with the parties they have, not the parties they want. Voters in
multiparty systems with proportional representation and coalition govern-
ments often will not only find themselves in such a situation, but also have
options to do something about it.
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Strategic voting usually requires that election outcomes be close and uncer-
tain. Voters can then at least believe that their vote (and that of like-minded
voters) will be decisive (Acevedo & Krueger 2004; Darmofal 2010). It also
requires that voters form fairly accurate expectations about the electoral
chances of parties and coalitions in the upcoming election. This implies that
strategic voters not only are politically sophisticated, but also have access to
fairly accurate and current information such as polls. The existing evidence for
strategic voting, however, is based mostly on district-level and survey-based
studies that offer corroborating but circumstantial evidence. Even the key
dependent variable – strategic voting – is ambiguous. Observed defections
from the most preferred party are assumed to be due to deliberate strategic
considerations and not due to other, non-instrumental factors. Many of these
votes may in fact be merely ‘insincere’ (following the definition that only a vote
for the most-preferred party is sincere). Without carefully distinguishing
strategic from insincere voters, the results of previous research might be
misleading.
Conclusive micro-level causal tests of the conditions and processes that
lead to strategic voting decisions are mostly missing. Notable exceptions are
laboratory experiments in the economic tradition that do offer direct,
individual-level support for strategic voting (e.g., Forsythe et al. 1993, 1996;
McCuen & Morton 2010; Meffert & Gschwend 2007). At the same time, these
experiments use highly abstract, context-free settings and monetary incentives
that make a generalisation of the findings very difficult.
The purpose of this study is to test whether voters in multiparty systems
conform to the expectations of the theory of strategic voting. The method is
an information-selection and voting experiment conducted during two real
German state election campaigns. Two crucial pre-electoral cues – nonparti-
san polls and partisan coalition signals – were unobtrusively manipulated
and participants’ decision-making behaviour closely traced and measured.
First, we develop our specific expectations by reviewing research on strategic
voting in general and on polls and coalition signals in particular.
Strategic voting
Strategic voting, or more precisely, behaviour that looks like strategic voting,
has been documented for a variety of election systems, from parliamentary
democracies to presidential systems, and under different electoral rules. Evi-
dence has been found for countries such as Austria (Meffert & Gschwend
2010), Germany (Bawn 1999; Gschwend 2007a; Pappi & Thurner 2002;
Shikano et al. 2009), Great Britain (Alvarez & Nagler 2000; Franklin
2 michael f. meffert & thomas gschwend
© 2011 The Author(s)
European Journal of Political Research © 2011 European Consortium for Political Research
et al.1994; Lanoue & Bowler 1992; Niemi et al. 1992, 1993), Israel (Bargsted &
Kedar 2009), The Netherlands (Irwin & Van Holsteyn 2002, 2003), Canada
(Blais et al. 2001, 2006; Lanoue & Bowler 1998), New Zealand (Karp et al.
2002), Spain (Lago 2008), Portugal (Gschwend 2007b) and the United States
(Abramson et al. 1992, 1995). While evidence for strategic voting can be found
for most elections, the number of voters who actually engage in strategic voting
is fairly low and typically ranges between 5 and 15 per cent of the electorate.
In fact, strategic voting only makes sense if the appropriate conditions are
given – primarily a close race and plausible alternative choices (Alvarez et al.
2006).
Strategic voting behaviour has been very well documented for electoral
systems with single member districts and plurality elections – most notably
Great Britain – and to a lesser degree for electoral systems with multiparty
systems using proportional representation (Cox 1997). The latter type of
system usually leads to coalition governments but might offer as many, if not
more, incentives for strategic voting than British-type systems, especially for
supporters of small parties (Abramson et al. 2010). First, proportional rep-
resentation is usually not free from important restrictions – most notably a
minimum vote threshold that a party must pass to become eligible for seats
in parliament. Falling short of such a threshold means that a vote for a party
is ‘wasted’ or ‘lost’ because it does not count toward the distribution of seats
in parliament. Small parties that are close to the threshold, or fail to pass the
threshold, should raise strategic considerations of the electoral chances
among supporters of small parties. Strategic voters might also be found
among supporters of major parties. If the preferred major party has a pre-
ferred junior coalition partner that is in danger of falling short of the elec-
toral threshold, they might employ a coalition insurance strategy. Casting a
strategic list vote for the junior coalition partner might ensure that it can
pass the threshold and make the preferred coalition possible (Gschwend
2004, 2007a).
Our expectation is deceptively simple. A close election and plausible
alternative choices should increase the likelihood of strategic voting.
The challenge is to find, or more precisely to create, circumstances under
which voters face a close election for their preferred party along with
available options to vote strategically. In most real elections, few voters find
themselves in such a situation, and even if they do and defect from their
most preferred party, it is virtually impossible to rule out alternative,
non-strategic considerations for this decision. The solution we propose
below involves an experimental manipulation of poll information to create
theoretically relevant scenarios, but in the context of actual election
campaigns.
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Polls, electoral expectations and political sophistication
Polls are a fact of life in political campaigns and widely reported in the media.
The question as to whether polls have any consistent effect on voters, however,
is far from settled (e.g., Mutz 1998).The theory of strategic voting assumes that
voters form rational expectations about the outcome of an election or, more
precisely, how well the parties will perform in the upcoming election (Cox
1997). Pre-election polls are the most important (even if not always correct)
source of such information and widely disseminated in the media during
political campaigns.
The availability of reliable polls, however, is not enough. Evidence from
public opinion research suggests that political expectations are subject to
prevalent projection effects. Expectations are often found to be strongly
shaped and distorted by existing political preferences (Abramson et al. 1992;
Babad 1995; Babad et al. 1992; Bartels 1985, 1987; Blais & Turgeon 2004; Dolan
& Holbrook 2001; Gimpel & Harvey 1997; Granberg & Brent 1983; Johnston
et al. 1992; Lewis-Beck & Skalaban 1989; Mutz 1998). For Germany, Schoen
(1999, 2000) shows that the expectation of whether or not a small party will
pass the 5 per cent minimum vote threshold is shaped by party identification.
Voters tend to overestimate the chances of preferred small parties while
underestimating the chances of disliked small parties. The literature cited
above suggests that expectations are a product of both preference-driven
projections and objective external sources of information such as polls. The
opposite case, that expectations influence preferences, is possible as well, but
given only a very low probability in the literature (Granberg & Brent 1983;
Mutz 1998).
If we accept that polls are the best available source of nonpartisan, fairly
objective information about the possible outcome of an upcoming election, the
more pertinent questions become who pays attention to polls and who uses
such information to make better predictions of electoral outcomes.
The most obvious answer is political sophisticates. Voters with a high level
of political knowledge should be most aware of the latest polls and thus
have a better ability to make accurate election forecasts. Awareness of
political information is, after all, a defining characteristic of political
sophistication (Zaller 1992). Dolan and Holbrook (2001) show that knowledge
improves the forecasting accuracy of voters. While mere ‘membership in the
polity’ (Lewis-Beck & Skalaban 1989; see also Irwin & Van Holsteyn 2002) and
experience with historical coalition formation patterns (Armstrong & Duch
2010) should be sufficient to make reasonable predictions, access to current
polls is required for more accurate forecasts of particular elections.
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Even low sophisticates are not necessarily lost.Access and attention to poll
information in the media should make it possible for virtually every voter
interested in meaningful forecasts to do so, and work against the projection
effect at the same time. Unless an individual chooses to disregard or misper-
ceive objective information, factual information should constrain the projec-
tion effect. It is reasonable to assume that strategic voters are motivated by a
need for accuracy (Fiske & Taylor 1991) or behave as if they were ‘intuitive
scientists’ (Baumeister & Newman 1994) who carefully search and process
information to maximise accuracy. The evidence, however, is mixed. Babad
(1995), for example, finds that access to relevant information does not prevent
wishful thinking, while Babad et al. (1992) find that information reduces
wishful thinking to zero.
In summary, politically sophisticated voters are expected to have both the
motivation and ability to form accurate election forecasts. Partisan voters, on
the other hand, might have the motivation to pay attention to poll information,
but their political preferences should also induce wishful thinking and a dis-
torted perception of factual information. Given this uncertain relationship,
both the actual polls as well as their perceptions might affect voters’ decisions
and will have to be taken into account.
Coalition signals
In parliamentary systems using proportional representation, individual parties
mostly fail to obtain an absolute majority of seats to govern alone (Katz 1997).
Typical governments are coalitions of two or more parties. Even if voters
usually cast only a single vote for one party, they might very well be aware of
possible coalitions after the election and might take these expectations into
account (Blais et al. 2006; Gschwend 2004, 2007a; Meffert & Gschwend 2010).
In fact, parties will often and explicitly send out signals to either rule out a
coalition with another party or to announce a preference for a future coalition
partner. Such cues or signals should help voters when deciding how to cast a
vote. If two parties have (credibly) ruled out a specific coalition, it will not
make sense for a strategic voter to cast a ballot in favour of this coalition.
In the case of Germany, the setting of our study, parties often use specific
appeals or coalition signals to explicitly suggest strategic voting (Gschwend
2007a; Schoen 2000; Roberts 1988). These appeals will often be negative by
ruling out a coalition with some other party, often in an attempt to project
electoral strength by denying the need for a coalition partner. Negative
appeals might be the default response but with limited credibility as a given
electoral outcome will often force parties to form specific coalitions, no matter
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the denials before an election. The more interesting appeals are positive and
signal to voters a desirable coalition partner (while implicitly admitting that
the party needs a partner to win). The typical example is an incumbent or
newly proposed two-party coalition with a strong major party and a small
junior partner. If the latter is weak and in danger of falling short of the
electoral threshold, German parties often resort to explicit appeals for strate-
gic voting in the form of a ‘rental vote’ (Leihstimme). Supporters of the safe
major party are asked to cast, or ‘rent out,’ a vote for the small coalition
partner to insure the minor party’s entry into parliament and to make the
desired coalition possible.
If coalition signals turn out to facilitate strategic voting, this would have
interesting implications for the theory of strategic voting. These signals can be
a convenient shortcut for strategic voters to form expectations about the
electoral outcomes. However, if voters merely follow such a signal without
adjusting their electoral expectations in a way that would justify the defection
from the preferred party, a strategic vote would not be the result of a sophis-
ticated and informed decision making process, but rather a passive reaction to
explicit partisan appeals by the parties. By definition, such a vote would not be
strategic, but merely insincere. In short, our final expectation is that coalition
signals increase the likelihood of insincere or strategic voting, at all levels of
political sophistication.
Experimental study design
The goal of the study is to test the effects of polls and coalition signals on
strategic voting.This raises a number of methodological issues.The vast major-
ity of studies about strategic voting at the individual level are based on cross-
sectional surveys, conducted before or after a single election. This makes a
causal test more or less impossible.This is a particularly serious problem when
the relationship of preferences and expectations is unclear and possibly recip-
rocal. Second, looking at a single election usually does not provide much
variation in the polls or changing coalition signals. Both are fairly stable and
consistent before elections, and every voter will receive more or less the same
information.As a consequence, it is nearly impossible to establish a causal link
from exposure to polls and other signals to political behaviour. Even if objec-
tive conditions favouring strategic voting exist, they might only affect a small
part of the electorate (Alvarez et al. 2006). In short, it is very difficult to
determine the effect of polls and coalition signals and the tendency to vote
strategically with cross-sectional surveys.
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As an alternative, laboratory experiments can overcome the problem of
establishing causality by clearly separating cause and effect. They allow for a
careful construction of apparently objective conditions such as a close election.
However, laboratory studies come with the downside of limited external valid-
ity. Experiments usually use fictitious scenarios that might provide excellent
tests of causal hypotheses, but fail to account for the complexity of real world
elections.
Because the goal of this study is to test the causal effects of polls and
coalition signals on strategic voting, we chose an experimental approach.
However, instead of creating a fictitious election campaign, the experiment
was embedded in two real election campaigns, and the information used in the
study was drawn from actual party platforms. Only the election polls and
coalition signals were manipulated within a plausible range. A crucial advan-
tage of such an approach is the possibility to tap into and use the actual party
preferences of participants, making a strategic voting decision more ‘costly’
compared to purely fictional parties and campaigns. At the same time, this
approach allows for the random assignment of participants to different poll-
based scenarios to test whether different ‘objective’ conditions of close elec-
tions have the expected effect on strategic voting.
The electoral context
The study took place in January 2006, at the beginning of two contemporane-
ous election campaigns in the two adjacent German states of Baden-
Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate. Both elections were held on 26
March. Both states share a number of relevant characteristics. First, the five
parties that could reasonably be expected to enter parliament were identical
and included two large parties – the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU)
and the left-of-centre Social Democrats (SPD) – as well as three smaller
parties: the liberal Free Democrats (FDP), the environmental Green Party
(Greens) and a new far-left party (WASG/Die Linke), drawing mostly on
disaffected and/or former members of labour unions and the SPD. Second,
both states were governed by fairly popular coalition governments with one
large and one small party, making any dramatic electoral volatility highly
unlikely (but also limiting plausible manipulations of electoral closeness to the
three small parties). Third, both states use an electoral system with propor-
tional representation in which voters have a single party list vote that deter-
mines who will be represented in the state parliament.1 Parties have to pass a
5 per cent minimum vote threshold to enter parliament. Fourth, the party
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platforms in both states were, for all practical purposes, identical except for
state-specific differences and issues. None of the latter played any notable role
during these campaigns.
Despite all these commonalities, there was one crucial difference between
the states: two different coalition governments. Baden-Württemberg was gov-
erned by a CDU-led coalition, while Rhineland-Palatinate was governed by an
SPD-led coalition. In both cases, the FDP was the junior coalition partner.
While re-election of the two coalitions was the most likely outcome in each
state, it was also quite plausible that the Greens might replace the FDP as the
junior coalition partner, depending on the election outcome. In comparison,
the electoral strength of the new WASG was much more uncertain, and the
likelihood that it would join a coalition, even with the left-of-centre SPD,
extremely small.2
Taken together, the two states offered the opportunity, just before the
start of the actual election campaigns, to create scenarios that would either
facilitate or inhibit strategic voting, depending on different but plausible
polls and coalition signals. Because there was no doubt that the incumbent
major party would again be the winner in each state, the plausible manipu-
lations had to focus on the expected performance of the three small parties,
including whether they would successfully pass the 5 per cent threshold to
enter the state parliament and whether one of them would pull ahead of the
other two small parties. Given the many similarities, it was possible to
create equivalent contexts or decision scenarios by systematically ‘sending’
study participants to the state that best matched their political preferences




A total of 280 students (105 female and 169 male; mean age 25 years, ranging
from 18 to 50 years) participated in the computer-based experiment con-
ducted at the beginning of, and embedded in, two German state election
campaigns in January 2006. For the analyses, only the 200 participants who
were eligible to vote in German elections were used.3 The participants took
about 50 minutes to complete the study and received €7 for their participa-
tion. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to investigate
how voters inform themselves during an election campaign. More specifi-
cally, they were asked to take on the role of a voter and prepare to vote in
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the upcoming state election by choosing and reading information about the
parties and the campaign (including the manipulated and unobtrusively
embedded polls and coalition signals).
Information search: Process tracing with a dynamic information board
Study participants were exposed to a stream of quickly changing campaign
information on a dynamic information board. The information covered party
positions on various issues as well as poll results and coalition signals. Similar
to Lau and Redlawsk (2006) and Meffert et al. (2006), the information board
displayed information sequentially. Out of necessity, participants were forced
to be selective in their choice of messages based on short headlines. Custom-
developed software was used to both present and track the information selec-
tion behaviour of the participants. Unlike earlier information board designs
(Huang & Price 2001; Lau & Redlawsk 2006), our information board did not
use labels such as ‘political experience’ or ‘position on abortion’ to categorise
and pre-sort the headlines according to specific types of information. Instead,
the information appeared as an apparently random stream of messages similar
to newspaper headlines on a website (e.g., ‘CDU proposes a privileged part-
nership with Turkey’).
Campaign information
The campaign information consisted of 90 headlines and articles that were
presented on 15 sequential screens, always with six headlines visible on one
screen (Figure 1). Each screen was called a ‘week’ to simulate and highlight
the passing of time until the election. A total of 75 headlines and articles
were party-specific and covered the five relevant parties running in each
election (CDU, SPD, FDP, Greens and WASG). For each party, the informa-
tion covered the two leading candidates as well as the official party positions
on 13 different issues (including fairly generic topics such as innovation and
the economy, and fairly specific and current topics such as the introduction
of tuition payments at universities, the fight against bird flu and prohibitions
against state employees wearing a veil). The remaining 15 articles were split
evenly between five covering manipulated pre-election polls (see below), five
about other real but generic polls without any immediate electoral implica-
tions such as the popularity of state politicians or satisfaction with one’s
personal financial situation, and five purely informational articles about each
state’s current issues or political history.
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Figure 1. Screenshots of front page and article page of information board.
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Manipulation of polls and coalition signals
The poll results were manipulated to affect the expectation of how close the
upcoming election would be. Manipulation was made possible by the fact that
the study took place shortly before the actual campaigns got under way and
the media started to report about polls. Outside election campaigns, media
reports about state-level polls are very rare in Germany. At the same time, the
manipulations had to be plausible and were thus constrained by the political
reality in the two states. Because the large party in each state was expected to
win by large margins, the poll manipulation focused on the more uncertain
outcome for the three small parties. As potential coalition partners of the
respective large party, they would play a pivotal role in the formation of the
new government.
At the beginning of the study, participants were asked to provide a prefer-
ence ranking of the five parties. This ranking was used for the conditional or
systematic assignment of participants to standardised and comparable elec-
toral scenarios. First, participants were assigned to the state in which their
highest ranked major party was the incumbent and was expected to win again
in the upcoming election (CDU in Baden-Württemberg and SPD in
Rhineland-Palatinate). Second, the highest ranked small party of each partici-
pant was used for the poll and coalition signal manipulations (described
below). The small party was assumed to represent the preferred coalition
partner for the preferred large party.4 Third, depending on which party was
ranked highest overall, participants were categorised as either major-party
(CDU, SPD) or small-party (FDP, Green Party, Left Party) supporters. The
latter categorisation determined how the poll manipulation would create a
close election outcome based on the 5 per cent threshold.
Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of three poll conditions
that suggested election outcomes of varying closeness. First, in the control
condition, the preferred major party (‘41 per cent’) and the preferred small
party (‘10 per cent’) were expected to comfortably win the election and con-
stitute the only feasible coalition (with the obvious exception of a grand
coalition between the two major parties – an outcome that was not considered
likely in either state). Second, in the close election (or failure) condition, the
preferred small party was either just on the threshold required for entering
parliament and thus in acute danger of failing (‘5 per cent’, for major party
supporters) or just below the threshold and thus expected to fail to enter
parliament (‘4 per cent’, for small party supporters). In both cases, the polls
created classic scenarios for strategic voting. Major party supporters might
decide to defect from their safe and dominant major party and cast a rental
vote for the preferred small coalition partner to ensure this party’s entry into
polls, coalition signals and strategic voting 11
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parliament. Small party supporters on the other hand should realise that their
vote would be wasted on a party that had no chance to enter parliament, and
that it could be better used for a party with a realistic chance of becoming part
of the next government. Third, in the competition condition, the three small
parties were running neck-and-neck, with about ‘7 per cent’ each.This scenario
provided an incentive for strategic voting for major party supporters (to give
the preferred small party an edge over the competitors) but should work
against strategic voting among small party supporters who would rather be
motivated to support and strengthen their preferred party. Participants were
assigned to the three conditions with 20, 50 and 30 per cent probability (with
the assumption, based on a pilot study, that participants would be split about
evenly between major party and small party supporters). For the analyses
reported below, the different conditions are combined in two categories
depending on whether or not the poll created a close election outcome assumed
to facilitate strategic voting or a safe outcome without an incentive for strategic
voting.
In addition to the poll manipulation we employed a coalition signal
manipulation, operationalised in a fairly straightforward manner. The poll
articles either made no reference to possible coalitions at all, or mentioned a
coalition of preferred major and minor party by letting prominent politicians
in each party express support for this coalition.5 The signals were embedded in
typical headlines and slogans used during elections – for example, stating that
politicians of the preferred major party were ‘hoping for a coalition with
[preferred small party]’ or that politicians of the small party are ‘appealing for
“rental votes” of [preferred major party] supporters’.The two signal conditions
were assigned randomly with even probability and independent of the poll
condition.
Participants encountered the manipulated information in two ways. Early
during the information search, after two screens with headlines, all participants
were asked to participate in a pre-election poll. After answering the poll, they
were shown a results page (Figure 2) which presented a table with the manipu-
lated poll results on the left and a short verbal summary of the results on the
right, highlighting the closeness of the poll for those who failed to draw these
conclusions from the numerical table on their own. At the bottom, two brief
statements attributed to the two preferred parties of each participant, again in
newspaper headline format, were used for the coalition signal manipulation.
All participants encountered and read this page before continuing with the
information board task.
The second opportunity to encounter poll results was as part of the infor-
mation displayed on the information board. The five articles covering the
manipulated polls (out of 90 in total) presented the same poll results and
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coalition signals and only framed them differently by highlighting different
aspects. These five articles were phrased identically. Only the names of the
parties were automatically substituted depending on the party preferences of
a given participant. Unlike the poll results page described above, participants
had to deliberately select and read these five articles. Consequently, the articles
offer a hard behavioural test of attention to pre-election polls.
Procedures and measures
Participants started by indicating their position on or agreement with 14
political issues (see Figure 3 for an outline of the study). Next, they were asked
to rank the five parties by preference. These responses were used for the
systematic assignment to the poll and signal conditions as described above.
Participants read a brief introduction to the state election campaign of the
assigned state, followed by an introduction and trial run of the information
board. After completing the trial run, the main task of the study started. The
90 headlines were presented on the information board, always six headlines
on each screen that remained visible for a fixed interval of 45 seconds. All
Figure 2. Poll results page after pre-election poll.
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participants encountered the same 90 headlines, but their order was ran-
domised similar to a quota sample. The six headlines on each screen always
matched the six information categories defined by the five parties (issue posi-
tions or candidate information) and the sixth category with poll or other
Figure 3. Plan of study.
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state-specific information – that is, one headline each. The order of the 15
articles within each information category and the order of the six headlines on
each screen were randomised for each participant.
Participants were instructed that they could choose any article for reading
by clicking on the headline. The associated article with a length of approxi-
mately 120 words opened in a window partially covering the headline page of
the information board (Figure 1). The article page remained open until it was
closed again by the participant. Participants were allowed to read as many
articles as they wanted, but even while they were reading an article, the
headlines on the front page continued to change at the fixed interval of 45
seconds. After the first two screens, the search was interrupted and paused for
the pre-election poll that asked participants to indicate their party preference
at that time, including an additional ‘don’t know’ option. It was followed by the
results page which summarised the manipulated polls and coalition signals
(Figure 2).
After the information search ended, participants were asked to vote for
their final party choice, followed by an open-ended listing of reasons for their
vote as well as an agreement rating with various reasons frequently given by
voters. The latter reasons included one statement typical for strategic voters
(Fisher 2004) – ‘My preferred party has no chance’ – as well as one about
habitual party voting, a behaviour that should work against strategic voting: ‘I
always vote for this party.’ Participants indicated the degree to which these
reasons applied to their vote decision on a five-point rating scale. Participants
were also asked to make a forecast of the election outcome, including precise
party vote shares and a (predicted) 90 per cent confidence interval – that is, the
upper and lower bound for each party vote share prediction. Given the diffi-
culty of this task, the software assisted the participants by requiring party vote
share predictions to add up to 100 per cent and constrained the predicted
upper and lower limits for each party vote share prediction to be below or
above (or similar to) these forecasts. Participants had to provide complete
forecasts before continuing.6 For the analysis, the accuracy of these forecasts
was determined by subtracting the manipulated poll results from each partici-
pant’s party vote share predictions. The absolute values were averaged to
calculate the mean absolute error (MAE) of the predictions. The MAE mea-
sures the extent to which the predictions deviate from the polls.
The study continued with detailed questions about party and coalition
preferences and other political orientations of the participants. Standard mea-
sures relevant for the subsequent analyses are political interest and the
strength of party identification. Participants listed their demographics (e.g.,
sex) and were asked about their general attitudes towards polls. More specifi-
cally, they were asked about their attention to polls before elections (five-point
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scale), the perceived accuracy of polls (four-point scale), whether they usually
consider polls when making a vote decision (five-point scale), and about the
approximate time of their last encounter with actual, state-specific polls (six
response options).7
At the end, participants responded to an open-ended political knowledge
scale that included 14 factual questions about the offices or positions of various
national and international politicians (or vice versa) as well as questions about
the political system, with all items unrelated to the two states in our study
(mean = 6.59, SD = 3.10, a = 0.80).
Results
Attention to polls and the accuracy of poll and coalition signal perceptions
Participants selected and read, on average, 29 articles including about two
articles (out of five) covering manipulated polls and coalition signals
(Figure 4). Together with the poll results page seen by every participant, they
did have a fairly high chance of encountering the poll information repeatedly.
The interest in poll-related articles was even higher if the articles with generic
(not manipulated) poll information were included in the count. On average,
participants read 1.7 generic poll articles (out of five) covering the popularity
of state politicians, surveys about satisfaction with the personal financial situ-
ation and similar topics. At the same time, the articles covering polls were
clearly not the primary interest of the participants. With an average of slightly
more than seven articles, participants paid by far the most attention to infor-
mation about their most preferred party. In fact, the attention to articles about
the different parties tracks perfectly with the party ranking given by the
participants at the beginning of the study.
To better assess who pays attention to poll information, the number of
manipulated poll articles (0 to 5) read by a participant was regressed on two
self-reported indicators of political motivation, political interest and strength
of party identification, an indicator for small party supporters, and the factual
political knowledge scale. In addition, three general attitudes or opinions
about polls that might affect attention to polls were included as well: attention
to pre-election polls in general, the perception of the accuracy of polls and the
extent to which a participant usually considers polls when making a vote
decision. Because preliminary analyses showed that the sex of the participant
had a surprising and unexpected effect on this and some subsequent models,
this demographic variable is included in the model as well.
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The results show that neither the two political motivations nor the status as
a small party supporter affected the selection of poll articles, even though
strength of party identification comes very close to standard levels of signifi-
cance (Table 1).8 Instead, general political knowledge emerges as a highly
significant predictor of attention, supporting the notion that political knowl-
edge – representing better developed cognitive capacities for political infor-
mation – increases interest in more complex and horse-race-related political
information. This finding is further supported by the fact that self-reported
attention to (or interest in) polls in general does not affect the actual selection
of such information. Only agreement with the goal-directed attitude of using
polls for the vote decision has a significant and positive impact. In addition,
male respondents were significantly more likely to select poll articles. In short,
attention to polls appears to be goal-driven and more common among political
sophisticates.
Moving from the quantity of exposure to the quality of poll perceptions, we
investigated whether participants used this information to form and calibrate
Figure 4. Selection of articles by category.
Notes: Bars represent the average number of articles selected for reading in six different
headline categories. Each category was represented with one randomly chosen headline on
each of the 15 screens. The party categories are based on the initial party rankings provided
by each participant.
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their predictions about the outcome of the election. To assess this impact, we
first looked at the most critical component of the poll manipulation: the
forecasts for the most preferred small party.As Figure 5 shows, the poll manipu-
lation was successful, at least in relative terms.The average predicted vote share
for the most preferred small party declines significantly with lower poll values,
from a high of 9.8 per cent in the control condition (‘10 per cent’) to a low of 6.4
per cent in the failure condition (‘4 per cent’) (F = 9.85, p < 0.001). The same
applies to the predicted lower limit of the party vote share, ranging from 6.6 to
4.1 per cent (F = 18.59, p < 0.001), and the predicted upper limit of the vote
share, ranging from 12.8 to 6.6 per cent (F = 10.64, p < 0.001). Even though the
manipulated polls significantly affected the forecasts, the latter are still subject
to considerable projection effects. On average, participants added between 1.7
and 2.9 percentage points to the polls, expecting the preferred small party to
perform better than predicted by the reported polls. The only exception is the
control condition with an already high ‘10 per cent’ poll.
Even in the failure condition, the party is expected to safely pass the 5 per
cent threshold. For this reason, the predicted lower limit of the 90 per cent
confidence interval becomes critical. This prediction most clearly reflects the
intent of the poll manipulation, to create uncertainty due to a close election. In
the two safe conditions (‘10 per cent’ and ‘7 per cent’), the predicted lower





Strength of PID 0.17 (0.10)
Political interest 0.13 (0.17)
Small party supporter 0.19 (0.19)
Attention to polls (in general) 0.19 (0.14)
Accuracy of polls (in general) -0.16 (0.18)
Use of polls (in general) 0.22* (0.10)





Note: Entries are unstandardised regression coefficients, with standard errors in parenthe-
ses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
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limits are on average well above the 5 per cent threshold. In the two conditions
with a close outcome (‘5 per cent’ and ‘4 per cent’), the lower limits match the
polls with 4.8 and 4.1 per cent more or less perfectly. In short, participants had
the tendency to overestimate the chances of the preferred small party, but
clearly perceived the risk of failure when suggested by the polls. Overall, the
poll manipulation can be considered successful.
Our hypotheses suggest that political sophisticates not only pay more
attention to poll information, but are also able to make more accurate fore-
casts. Participants driven by partisan preferences, on the other hand, should
neither have a particular interest in polls nor the motivation to make accurate
forecasts.We regressed the mean absolute error (MAE) of the party vote share
predictions, the average deviation from the reported and manipulated poll
results, on several predictors.These include again the two political motivations
political interest and strength of party identification, the indicator for
small party supporters, as well as political knowledge. A new and important
Figure 5. Predicted vote shares and confidence intervals for the preferred small party.
Notes: A one-way ANOVA test of the poll manipulation shows significant effects on the
predicted vote share (F[3,196] = 9.85, p < 0.001), the predicted upper confidence interval
(F[3,195] = 10.64, p < 0.001) and the predicted lower confidence interval (F[3,195] = 18.59,
p < 0.001).
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predictor of accurate perceptions is the number of articles with poll informa-
tion read by a participant. Because political knowledge already affects the
selection of articles, it is possible that the impact of reading articles differs for
different levels of knowledge. On the one hand, political sophisticates should
be better able to understand and use poll information. On the other, political
sophisticates should be able to quickly understand the implications after
seeing only a single poll article. Reading additional articles covering the same
poll results therefore may not improve the accuracy of predictions any further.
It is more reasonable to expect that those participants low in political sophis-
tication would benefit more from repeatedly reading the same information. In
short, while both political knowledge and the reading of additional poll articles
can be expected to reduce prediction errors, the interaction of both variables
should show a declining error-reduction effect of reading more articles as
political knowledge increases. To control for the possibility that exposure to
real polls before participating in the study had influenced the participants, a
dichotomous indicator is included for those who reported recently encounter-
ing state-specific polls.9
While the prediction error model has only modest explanatory power (Adj.
R2 = 0.17, Table 2), it demonstrates again the important role of political sophis-
tication, along with a conditional effect of reading additional poll articles. Both
political knowledge and poll articles significantly reduce the errors in the
forecasts and show a significant interaction effect as well. According to the
latter, the error reducing effect of reading poll articles diminishes with increas-
ing levels of sophistication and, in fact, completely disappears for high sophis-
ticates (Figure 6). In other words, the fact that high sophisticates read more
poll articles does not appear to provide any additional benefit for improving
forecasts. Those participants low in political knowledge can improve the accu-
racy of their predictions rather dramatically by reading more articles.They can
even close the gap to high sophisticates. Thus, high sophisticates are again the
winner of the contest, but the lead is not unassailable.
In contrast to the poll attention model, small party supporters emerge as
being more accurate in their predictions than major party supporters, offering
support for the notion that this information is more important to them. It
should also be noted that there were no sex differences in the forecast error
model, and that previous and recent exposure to polls in the media did not
have any effect on the accuracy of the predictions.
The second manipulation involved the presence or absence of a coalition
signal for the preferred major and small party of each participant.At the end of
the study, participants were asked whether they had noticed such a coalition
signal (between the expected winner – the preferred large party – and each of
the three small parties as well as a ‘none’ and a ‘don’t know’ option).The fairly
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subtle signal manipulation did affect the signal perception, increasing the
perception of the preferred parties-coalition from 14.8 per cent without signal
to 45.7 per cent with the signal while ‘no signal’-perceptions dropped from 56.5
to 34.8 per cent and ‘don’t know’ responses from 24.1 to 13.0 per cent.A wrong
perception of a different coalition was fairly low in either case: 4.6 and 6.5 per
cent, respectively (c2[3] = 24.83, p < 0.001)10 In short, the signal manipulation
was successful as well.
We used the dichotomous indicator of noticing a coalition signal for the two
preferred parties as our dependent variable and regressed it on the randomly
assigned coalition signal condition (present or not) as well as the same pre-
dictor variables used above: political interest, strength of party identification,
number of poll articles, political knowledge and small party supporter (except
the irrelevant question about encountering polls). The results differ from the
poll model in one crucial respect: political knowledge does not affect the
perception of the coalition signal, nor does the status of a small party supporter
(Table 3).The presence of a coalition signal had a strong impact, increasing the
likelihood of perceiving the correct signal by 38 percentage points.11 Reading
Table 2. Errors in poll perception
Mean absolute error




Poll articles (N) -0.34** (0.07)
Poll articles x knowledge 0.08** (0.02)
Strength of PID 0.05 (0.11)
Political interest 0.36 (0.20)
Small party supporter -0.75** (0.22)
Sex (male) -0.14 (0.26)





Notes: Entries are unstandardised regression coefficients, with standard errors in parenthe-
ses.The mean absolute error (MAE) represents the average absolute prediction error of the
predicted party vote shares (compared to the manipulated poll results). * p < 0.05;
** p < 0.01.
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additional poll articles with the included, manipulated signal also contributed
to such a perception by up to 67 percentage points. The interaction of knowl-
edge and poll articles, however, failed to have a significant impact. The coef-
ficients suggest that those participants with low levels of political knowledge
benefited most from reading. Finally, the strength of party identification had a
significant impact, increasing the likelihood of perceiving the signal by up to 25
percentage points. These results suggest that political knowledge is not impor-
tant for picking up coalition signals, maybe because political sophisticates are
already aware of the possible coalitions and/or because they discount any
explicit signals sent out by the parties during campaigns. Much more sensitive
to such signals are those participants who identify more strongly with one of
the parties, whether large or small. The partisan signal identifies the party with
whom they have to ‘share’ their party preference in a coalition.
The picture that emerges from this first part of the analysis is fairly straight-
forward. Political sophistication increases interest in articles with poll
Figure 6. The effect of reading poll articles on forecast errors conditional on political
knowledge.
Notes: The line shows the predicted effect of reading five (versus none) poll articles on the
mean absolute prediction errors (MAE) at different levels of political knowledge. The
dotted lines represent the 95 per cent confidence interval of the predictions (simulated with
the Clarify module for Stata).
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information and also leads to more accurate forecasts of the election outcome.
Reading additional poll articles did not improve the forecasting ability of high
sophisticates beyond the single exposure to the pre-election poll on the results
screen. However, low sophisticates, much more error-prone in their predic-
tions, had an opportunity to overcome this disadvantage. If they made the
effort to read more articles with poll information, they were able to compen-
sate the knowledge advantage of high sophisticates. It is important to keep in
mind, though, that, on average, low sophisticates read fewer poll articles and
thus usually do not use this opportunity to catch up. Thus, closing this knowl-
edge gap is possible in theory, but rarely accomplished in practice. Partisan
signals, on the other hand, were more likely to be picked up by the highly
partisan, irrespective of political sophistication. Partisan voters appear to pay
more attention to statements by party representatives and the potential alli-
ances they propose. So far, the results conform to the assumptions of the
theory of strategic voting and suggest that voters, if motivated to maximise the
expected utility of their vote decision, can do so by seeking out the appropriate
information.
Effect of close polls and coalition signals on strategic voting
The second and more critical question is whether close polls and coalition
signals, actual or perceived, increase the likelihood of voting for a party other




Coalition signal (present) 1.78** (0.38)
Poll articles (N) 0.80* (0.33)
Knowledge 0.13 (0.12)
Poll articles x knowledge -0.07 (0.04)
Strength of PID 0.44* (0.20)
Political interest 0.11 (0.30)
Small party supporter -0.43 (0.37)




Notes: Entries are unstandardised logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in
parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
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than the most preferred party. For theoretical as well as substantive reasons, we
carefully distinguish explicit strategic voting from so-called ‘insincere voting’ –
that is, any vote for a different party than the one preferred most or ranked
highest.To be classified as a strategic voter, participants not only had to vote for
a party other than the one ranked highest – or any other party that was tied
(rated the same) with this party – but also volunteer at least one strategic
reason for their vote decision in the open-ended listing task after the final vote.
Any reference to polls or the chances of parties in the upcoming election was
considered to be a strategic reason. These two operationalisations of strategic
voting immediately translate into vastly different frequencies. While there are
48 (24 per cent) insincere voters in our sample, the number drops to only 10 (5
per cent) strategic voters. The different nature of these two groups comes in
even sharper focus when we look at the circumstances under which they defect
from the preferred party. For insincere voters, it did not matter whether or not
the manipulated polls created a close condition that warrants strategic voting.
They were equally likely to cast an insincere vote under close and safe condi-
tions, with 23.7 and 24.6 per cent in each case. Explicit strategic voters, on the
other hand, voted this way only when the polls suggested a close election (7.4
per cent). Without the incentive of a close election, and consistent with our
expectation, not a single strategic voter was found.
This result supports the theory of strategic voting but also suggests that
there are very few voters who can be classified as genuine strategic voters, even
when provided with the opportunity.12 Given the low number of just ten
explicitly strategic voters, it is not possible to conduct further in-depth analyses
of this group. Instead, we focus on the much larger group of insincere voters
and assess the factors that lead to defections from the preferred party. Given
the initial evidence against objective closeness as an explanatory factor for
defection, it might in fact be the individually perceived closeness that matters
most.A strategic voter could very well dismiss or distrust the current polls and,
for example, expect a tightening race just before the election. Consequently, we
include not only the objective poll or closeness manipulation in the model, but
also two subjective measures of closeness: the perceived (absolute) distance of
the preferred small party from the 5 per cent threshold as well as the endorse-
ment of the generic statement that ‘the preferred party does not have a
chance’. A similar strategy is used for the coalition signal manipulation by
including dichotomous indicators for the signal manipulation as well as the
signal perception. In order to make the effects of objective and perceived
indicators more transparent, the model is reported with and without the
perceptions. Four additional variables capture key aspects of participants’
party and policy preferences that should either facilitate defection (absolute
ideological distance of voters from their preferred party on an eleven-point
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left-right scale) or inhibit defection (party preference measured as evaluative
distance of the preferred party from the party rated second highest on an
eleven-point rating scale, strength of party identification and endorsement of
the statement that the voter ‘always votes for this party’). Finally, political
knowledge, small party supporter and sex of the participant were included as
control variables.
As expected, the manipulated poll condition did not have any direct effect
on insincere voting, no matter whether or not perceived closeness is included
in the model (Table 4). Yet if the perceived distance of the preferred small
party from the threshold increases, the likelihood of defection declines for a
typical voter by up to 10 percentage points, and those who felt that their
‘preferred party had no chance’ became up to 40 percentage points more likely
to defect.13 A similar but weaker pattern emerged for the coalition signal. The
manipulated coalition signal does not induce insincere voting directly, with or
without perceptions. Once the perceived coalition of the two preferred parties
is included, the signal perception increases defection by up to eight percentage
Table 4. Effect of close polls and coalition signals on insincere voting
Insincere vote
Without perceptions With perceptions
B SE B SE
Close poll (manipulation) -0.18 (0.48) -0.51 (0.52)
Perceived distance from threshold -0.24* (0.11)
‘Party no chance’ (agreement) 0.79** (0.23) 0.77** (0.25)
Coalition signal (manipulation) 0.72 (0.44) 0.51 (0.48)
Coalition signal (perception) 1.00+ (0.57)
Ideological distance 0.43+ (0.24) 0.45+ (0.26)
Strength of PID 0.04 (0.21) -0.09 (0.22)
Party preference -0.70* (0.33) -0.71* (0.34)
‘Habitual party voter’ (agreement) -0.99** (0.22) -1.10** (0.24)
Knowledge 0.18* (0.08) 0.16+ (0.09)
Small party supporter 0.32 (0.47) 0.43 (0.50)
Sex (male) -1.26* (0.51) -1.69** (0.57)
Constant -0.80 (0.89) 0.62 (1.01)
c2 75.71 85.38
N 200 200
Notes: Entries are unstandardised logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in
parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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points. In both cases, the perceptions of closeness and coalition signal mat-
tered, while the objective cues failed to translate directly into behavioural
intentions. However, as shown above, the objective conditions affect the
respective perceptions and thus exert an indirect effect.
Political predispositions, with the exception of the strength of party iden-
tification, mattered as well and in the expected directions. As the ideological
distance of the preferred party increased, defection became more likely (up to
17 points). Defection became less likely as the party preference for the pre-
ferred party increased (up to 10 points). Most strikingly, self-described
‘habitual party voters’ were much less likely to defect than swing voters (up to
28 points). Finally, political sophisticates were marginally more likely to vote
insincerely (up to 13 points), while male respondents were 17 percentage
points less likely to defect. In summary, insincere voting is caused by a variety
of factors. The key contextual cues for strategic voting – polls and coalition
signals – only play an indirect role.
Conclusion and discussion
The goal of this study was to test key theoretical assumptions and causal claims
about strategic voting by investigating the attention to and perception of
pre-election polls and coalition signals. By embedding a laboratory experiment
in a real election campaign, participants encountered credible and realistic
election scenarios while at the same time allowing the unobtrusive manipula-
tion of the causal factors of interest. The experimental design allowed us to
create theoretically relevant scenarios, customised to participants’ actual party
preferences, and gave us the opportunity to measure participants’ information
selection behaviour and prediction abilities in unusual detail. This made it
possible to put some basic assumptions about strategic voting to a real micro-
level test – something that is not possible with survey-based designs. Due to the
small and non-representative sample and the country-specific context, our
conclusions are necessarily more tentative and require further corroboration
with future research.
Substantively, we found that participants were, on average, able to translate
poll information into reasonable election forecasts. By looking at the accurate
perception of polls and coalition signals embedded in a steady stream of
political information within our dynamic information board set-up, two strik-
ingly different findings emerge. First, voters seem to acknowledge polls by
adjusting their forecasts accordingly, despite engaging in modest wishful think-
ing in favour of the preferred small party. Political sophisticates appear to
quickly adjust their forecasts of the electoral outcome to the polls, even
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without seeking out additional information (which they do nevertheless).
More importantly, however, less knowledgeable voters can, if they are moti-
vated and decide to do so, catch up by seeking out the appropriate informa-
tion. Thus, any voter can easily acquire the information necessary for
meaningful expectations and sophisticated vote decisions, but very few seem to
take full advantage of this opportunity – at least in our laboratory experiment.
Therefore, the findings of the poll perception model are consistent with the
assumptions of the strategic voting literature – in particular that political
sophisticates are usually aware of the (poll-based) electoral chances of the
parties.
Coalition signals, on the other hand, seem to follow a different dynamic.
The successful detection of coalition signals is not dependent on political
sophistication, but rather driven by partisan predispositions. Those who iden-
tify more closely with a party appear to also be more sensitive to these partisan
signals. If we consider coalition signals as valuable pieces of information for
strategic voters, the evidence suggests that campaign managers need to rethink
their campaign strategies in terms of coalition signals. The coalition signals
reach the wrong audience. Partisan voters who should be least likely to defect
from their party and vote strategically are most receptive to these signals (but
might abstain if they do not like the indicated coalition partner). Political
sophisticates who are better informed and who should be more likely to vote
strategically appear to miss these signals. Of course, it is reasonable to assume
that high sophisticates do not need to rely as much on explicit coalition signals
to develop meaningful expectations about the likely coalitions after the next
election.
Our findings raise crucial questions concerning previous assumptions about
strategic voting. First, we find a dramatic gap between fairly frequent insincere
voting and rather rare explicit strategic voting. Insincere voting might have
many different reasons, but according to our study, polls indicating a close
election outcome have at best an indirect influence.Two factors seem to entice
voters to defect from their preferred party. First, voters who believe that their
preferred party has no chance in the upcoming election tend to defect from
their party, independent of what the polls show. Second, perceived coalition
signals by the parties also seem to persuade some voters to defect. If the polls
do not justify such behaviour, it is, in instrumental or rational terms, in fact a
wrong decision. In both cases, information has at best an indirect influence on
voters’ behaviour. Individual perceptions and beliefs have a stronger and
direct influence. This does not correspond to the assumptions of the classic
strategic voter model.
The strategic voter model fares better if we focus exclusively on explicit
strategic voting. Such behaviour was only found, as it should be, if polls
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suggested a close election. However, the number of voters who explicitly
responded to such cues was very small. Taken together, the high number of
insincere voters and the low number of strategic voters suggest that research-
ers have to be very careful about how they classify and interpret voting
behaviour that defects from the preferred party. The common practice of
survey-based studies to consider all insincere voters as strategic voters appears
premature and misleading. And even if voters ‘rent out’ their vote after an
appeal by parties, they are not strategic voters in the classic and sophisticated
sense without a corresponding readjustment of their electoral expectations.
They are rather passive followers of the coalition signals sent out by political
parties.
If we consider the findings of our small laboratory experiment together
with recent survey-based evidence (e.g., Abramson et al. 2010), we can confi-
dently conclude that strategic voting in multiparty systems with coalition
governments is indeed possible, but that many questions remain. A better
understanding of strategic and insincere voting in general, and the role and
effects of coalition signals in particular, is only possible if more attention is
paid to the role of coalition preferences and expectations.
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Notes
1. Voters in Rhineland-Palatinate also have, besides the ‘second’ party list vote, the option
to cast a ‘first’ plurality vote for a candidate in their local district. This vote does not
affect the distribution of seats in the state parliament, only the candidates who fill these
seats. To maintain equivalent scenarios across states (and experimental conditions),
participants in our study could only cast a single party list vote.
2. The most recent and salient reference of electoral success available to voters was the
outcome of the general election for the German Bundestag on 18 September 2005,
several months earlier.All three small parties received approximately the same electoral
vote share (FDP: 9.8 per cent; Green Party: 8.1 per cent; Left Party [WASG/Die Linke]:
8.7 per cent).
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3. The data from six participants were lost due to technical computer or software prob-
lems. Five participants were excluded because they had already participated in the
pilot study. Finally, 69 participants who were not eligible to vote in German elections
were excluded because their knowledge of German politics was significantly lower
compared to native participants and they did not possess the required pre-existing
German party preferences. The latter were necessary for the experimental manipula-
tion (described below) and are a prerequisite to identify and analyse insincere
and strategic voting (both requiring a vote that deviates from an existing party pref-
erence). A large pilot study with the same design was conducted in December 2005
with 94 voluntary, unpaid participants drawn from an equivalent participant pool.
While successful, the pilot study led to one design modification: an additional poll
condition that represents an explicit and straightforward control condition (as
explained later).
4. Participants were explicitly asked about their coalition preferences later in the study.
The responses broadly confirmed this expectation.
5. The coalition signals were carefully phrased to be plausible whether or not this coalition
represented the incumbent governing coalition in a given state or whether it would
involve a new coalition after the election.
6. The order of vote decision (with listing and rating of reasons) and election forecast was
randomised, but because no order effects were found, the conditions were pooled and
are not further addressed below.
7. In Germany, publicly available polls at the state level are not very frequent and
usually do not receive prominent attention in the media unless shortly before the
election. The last poll reported in the media preceding this study happened one-and-
a-half months earlier. On the second-to-last day of the study, however, the media
reported the results of a new poll in one of the states. Of about 40 study participants
who could have encountered this poll, only nine reported being aware of it, with no
further evidence that this affected their forecasts or the perception of our manipulated
polls.
8. The OLS regression and an ordered logistic regression model provide similar results.
9. It is rather unlikely that exposure to published polls would have undermined our
manipulation because the real polls were fairly close to our manipulated polls.
10. Test conducted after combining the two ‘wrong’ coalition perception categories due to a
very low number of such responses.
11. The predicted effect sizes in terms of percentage point changes (here and in the subse-
quent models) were calculated for a typical voter – that is, the independent variables
were held constant at their mean or typical values.
12. It is important to note that our definition of a strategic voter does not depend on the
manipulated ‘objective’ poll results, only on explicitly stated strategic reasons for the
vote decision. Thus, strategic voters could easily exist in the safe poll conditions – for
example, if their subjective predictions about the performance of the parties would differ
from the polls. At the same time, our operationalisation fails to count strategic voters
who do not volunteer a strategic reason in the open-ended listing task.
13. The endorsement of this statement (by just 11 participants, or 5.5 per cent) is unre-
lated to both manipulated and perceived polls and the explicit statement of strategic
reasons (but more common among small party supporters). Consequently, it does not
appear to reflect any obvious considerations consistent with the theory of strategic
voting.
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